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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
No. 8734 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERNAL K. FRONK, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
STATE OF UTAH in the interest 
of VERNAL FLOYD FRONK, 
RICKY DEAN F R 0 N K, and 
CINDY LEE FRONK, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an Appeal from an Order of the Juvenile 
Court of the First District made June 10, 1957, depriv-
ing the parents of their three minor children. The matter 
was referred to the Juvenile Court after the conclusion 
of a divorce action between Betty :Mae Fronk and Vernal 
K. Fronk in the District Court of Weber County. The 
action was referred to the Juvenile Court pursuant to 
Sec. 55-10-5( 4), Utah Code Annotated 1953, for determin-
ation or recommendation concerning the custody of the 
children and to determine whether or not the parents 
should be permanently re.strained from visiting the chil-
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dren and the children released for adoption. The Juve-
nile Court on its own motion took judicial notice of the 
divorce c.ase of Betty Mae Fronk, Plaintiff, vs. Vernal 
K. Fronk, Defendant, Civil No. 31760, in the District 
Court of Weber County, although the Juvenile Court 
had no reporter's transcript of the proceeding in the 
divorce case. Such judicial notice was confined to the 
pleadings, findings and decree, (R.2). The hearing from 
which this .Appeal is taken was held before the Juvenile 
Court on June 10, 1957. The Appellant is the father of 
the three minor children concerned. At the time of the 
hearing, the three minor children were in a foster home 
under the supervision of the '\V eber County Department 
of Public Welfare. 
In: ,, 
l\1:r. Kent Leveridge, the Child Welfare Representa- ~w: 
tive of the Weber County Deparhnent of Public \Velfare, ,~l 
testified before the Court and stated that his Department 
found that they had not yet had sufficient time to prop-
erly evaluate the ability of the parents to care for the 
children, (R. 4, 5, 7, 11). :Jir. Leveridge offered no testi-
mony concerning the Appellant or his fitness to be 
awarded the custody of his children. 
The only testin1ony in opposition to Appellant's 
fitness to be awarded the custody of his children came 
fr01n his former wife and his n1other-in-law. His ex-
wife stated that Appellant ·went out with girls or worked 
on cars, (R. 16). She also stated that during the period 
prior to the divorce trial he followed her to .a beer tavern 
with a can1era, (R. 1-1). The only co1n1nent concerning 
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Appellant made by Mrs. Gorder, his mother-in-law, 
was that he was away from the children for about two 
years while he was in the Army, (R. 24). Appellant and 
his witnesses were not in the Court during the time that 
testimony had been given by Betty Fronk .and her wit-
nesses. They had been waiting in the Juvenile Court 
on the 8th floor of the Municipal Building and had not 
been advised that the hearing was being conducted in 
Judge vVahlquist's Courtroom on the 5th floor, (R. 28, 
30, 31). 
Following testimony relative to the fitness of the 
mother, the Court heard Appellant and the witnesses on 
his behalf. Appellant testified he was employed by the 
Ogden Iron Works in Ogden .as an electrician and that 
he earned $1.95 per hour, (R. 31). Appellant also said 
that he had made arrangements with his aunt, who had 
a three-bedroom home in Ogden, to care for the children 
in her home. Appellant stated that he could also reside 
in her home so that he could be with the children when 
he was not working, (R. 32). He indicated that he would 
make an effort to provide a good home for the children 
and would be willing to work under the direct super-
vision of the Weber County Department of Public W el-
fare, (R.34). This was confirmed by Mrs. Pearl Jenna, 
Appellant's aunt, who testified that she had a comfortable 
three-bedroom home with adequate room to provide a 
good home for the children, that she was not employed 
and was able to devote her full time to their care. She 
also stated that there was room for Appellant to reside in 
her home, ( R. 46). 
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Other witnesses testifying on behalf of the Appellant 
were G. Albert Wimmer, Bishop of the L.D.S. Ward in 
which Appellant and his family were members. Bishop 
Wimmer testified regarding the favorable conditions in 
the Fronk home .and Appellant's regular church attend-
ance, (R. 38, 39). Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Pledger, a couple 
who had been acquainted with the Fronk family for 
many years, testified concerning home conditions of the 
Fronk family and the regular attendance of the family 
in the Church, (R. 41, 44). 
During the course of the hearing on June 10, 1957, 
the Juvenile Court made several references to the fact 
that the custody of the children had been before it on 
September 7, 1956 and November 19, 1956, (R. 28, 29). 
Those hearings were not made a part of this Appeal be-
cause both of those hearings were devoted to an investi-
gation of alleged misconduct on the part of the mother 
of the children who is not a party to this Appeal. 
After the testi1nony of all of the witnesses had been 
heard, the matter was subnritted to the Court. The Court 
immediately rendered a decision upon the matter, stating 
that it was reluctant to place the children for adoption 
but felt that it \Yas the only course open. The Court 
-
~~-
further stated that under no circmnstances would it i'" 
consider returning the children to the father, (R. 49). 
The Order was then 1nade that the children be placed 
in the en~tody of the Deparhnent of Public \Yelfare for 
the purpose of placing the children for adoption. The 
foregoing Order was 1nade by the Court on June 10, 1957, 
the date of the hearing, (R. 49). The Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree and Judgment of 
the Juvenile Court were later filed on the 3rd day of 
July, 1957. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT HAVE BEFORE IT 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY 
TO ESTABLISH THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIT AND 
PROPER PERSON TO BE AWARDED THE CUSTODY OF 
HIS MINOR CHILDREN, OR THAT HE SHOULD BE PER-
MANENTLY DEPRIVED OF HIS .CHILDREN, AND THAT 
THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE PLACED FOR ADOPTION. 
POINT II. 
ASSUMING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS BE-
FORE THE COURT TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING THE CHIL-
DREN IN THE .CUSTODY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC WELFARE, IT WAS A GROSS ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION ON THE PART OF THE OOURT TO PER-
MANENTLY DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS MINOR 
CHILDREN AND ORDER THEM TO BE PLACED FOR 
ADOPTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT HAVE BEFORE IT 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY 
TO ESTABLISH THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIT AND 
PROPER PERSON TO BE AWARDED THE CUSTODY OF 
HIS MINOR CHILDREN, OR THAT HE SHOULD BE PER-
MANENTLY DEPRIVED OF HIS .CHILDREN, AND THAT 
THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE PLACED FOR ADOPTION. 
It is a universally established principle of common 
law that a parent's right to the custody and control of 
his minor children is a sacred right and a right with which 
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the Court should not interfere except where by conduct 
the parent forfeits that right. The common law also 
strongly favors the maintenance of natural parent-child 
relations as an element of great advantage to the child 
when the question of custody of a child is to be deter-
mined. 
"As long as parents properly exercise their duty, 
under their natural rights to rear, educate, and control 
their children, their right to do so may not be inter-
fered with solely because some other person or some 
other institution might be better deemed for that pur-
pose." 31 Am. Jur., Sec. 21, p. 794. 
However, in ca.ses where a parent fails to provide 
his children with the care to which such minor children 
are entitled, the proper courts, both at common law and 
under our statutes, may remove those children from the 
custody of the parents and place them in the care of a 
proper person. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
and applied the rule of law that "where the parent is 
a ri:wrally fit person to have the care and custody of his 
own offspring, his rights are paran1ount to the rights 
of all others." See Alley v. Alley, 67 Utah 316, 247 P. 
301, 304; and State c. Sorensen, 102 etah ±7±, 132 P.2d 
132, 134. 
This Court has also recognized the rule to be that 
there is a legal presun1ption that it is for the best in-
terests of the ehild and of society for the child to remain 
with its natural parents during the period of its minority 
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and be maintained, cared for, and educated by them ,and 
under their supervision and direction. Hummel v. Par-
rish, 43 Utah 373, 134 P. 898, 901; State v. Sorensen, 
supra. 
The following rules have been laid down by the Utah 
Supreme Court in regard to the evidence necessary to 
support a decision depriving a parent of his minor 
children: 
1. On any fact necessary to support a decision to 
deprive a parent of it.s child, the court must be first 
convinced of such fact by a preponderance of the evi-
dence on such question, and the burden of persuading 
the court is never on the parent. In re Bradley, 109 Utah 
538, 167 p .2d 978, 984. 
2. "The unfitness which will deprive a parent of the 
right to the custody of the child must be positive and 
not merely comparative, or merely speculative." Cooke 
v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83, 108; State v. Sorensen, 
supra. 
Appellant's first point then raise.s this question: 
Was the evidence produced at the Juvenile Court hear.-
ing of such character and of such weight to overcome 
the presumption of appellant's fitness to have the custody 
of his children and to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that appellant was not a fit and proper 
person to raise his children~ 
An examination of the evidence of appellant's con-
duct that could be construed as detrimental to his claim 
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to the custody of his children shows only the following 
acts on his part : 
1. Prior to the divorce trial he took photographs 
of his wife while she was in a tavern and as a re_sult 
of this there was some disturbance caused at the tavern, 
(R.14). 
2. His divorced wife felt that he couldn't give the 
children a good home because "he has been going out with 
girls," and "he would be running around or else work-
ing on cars," ( R. 16). 
3. The only complaint his mother-in-law, Mrs. Gord-
er, made concerning him was that he had been away from 
the children for two years while he was in the military 
service, (R. 24). 
4. The Child Welfare representative of the Weber 
County Department of Public Welfare testified that his 
dep:artment had not had sufficient time to make any 
recommendations concerning the fitness of the parents 
to retain the custody of the children. This witness offered 
no testimony that in any way indicated that appellant 
was unfit to care for his minor children, (R. 4, 5, 7, and 
11). 
The only other evidence that was in any way detri-
mental to appellant'.s position came from the Findings 
of the District Court in the divorce action. These find-
ings indicated that appellant was not presently a fit and 
proper person to be awarded the custody of his children 
because "he had not been sho\\Tn to be law abiding, honest 
8 
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or understanding of the children's needs or welfare," 
and further that he had been convicted of a felony by a 
United States Military Court. 
Certainly the evidence before the Juvenile Court 
concerning appellant's conduct was not of .such a positive 
nature as to establish by a preponderance of the evi· 
dence that appellant should be permanently deprived of 
his minor children. The only remaining ground upon 
which the Juvenile Court's action could be justified then 
is the finding that appellant was convicted of a felony 
by aU. S. Military Court. 
The question then raised is this: Does the conviction 
of a felony, per se, require that the Juvenile Court per-
manently deprive appellant of his children~ 
This question has twice been before the California 
appellate courts, and in both cases the court ruled that 
a felony conviction, standing alone, was not sufficient 
cause to deprive a parent of custody of his children. 
See In re Case's Guardianship, 57 Calif. Ap. 2d 844, 135 
P. 2d 681, 683. The court in discussing this question 
said: 
"Appellant contends that she was denied the 
privilege of cross examining Petitioner for the 
purpose of showing that petitioner was in a naval 
prison at the time that the maternal grandmother 
wa.s appointed guardian of the minor. Upon a 
trial of the character and fitness of the father 
to have the custody of his child, a misdeed which 
may have occurred many years prior to the hear-
ing is too remote to prove present unworthiness. 
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Serving a term in prison is not per se cause for 
depriving a parent of the ~custody of his child. The 
commis.sion of mala prohibita which may result 
in penal servitude is not conclusive proof of vi-
cious character." 
Also in a very recent case the California court again 
affirmed the same principle. See In re Minniear's Estate, 
141 Calif. Ap. 2d 703, 297 P. 2d 105, 108, where the 
Court said: 
"Appellant is right in saying that the time at 
which fitness may be judged is the present and 
not the past; that the mere fact that a parent has 
been convicted of a crime and has served a prison 
term is not an automatic bar to the award of 
custody." 
In 67 O.J.S., Sec. 12, at page 659, the following rule 
is se~t out: 
"In order to establish unfitness it must be 
shown that provision for the child's ordinary 
comfort or intellectual and moral development 
cannot reasonably be expected at the parent's 
hand." 
We submit that a consideration of all the evidence 
before the Juvenile Court fails to establish the unfitness 
of the appellant. On the contrary, the evidence show::; bnl 
that appellant has steady employment in his trade, has ~ 1 
sufficient earnings to properly support his children, 
(R. 31), has made real progre.ss in rehabilitating him-
self since his release fr01n n1ilitary detention, and has 
the n1eans and facilities to provide adequately for the 
ordinary c01nfort, education and n1oral develop1nent of 
his 1ninor children, (R. 32). 
10 
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POINT II. 
ASSUMING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS BE-
FORE THE COURT TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING THE CHIL-
DREN IN THE ·CUSTODY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC WELFARE, IT WAS A GROSS ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION ON THE PART OF THE OOURT TO PER-
MANENTLY DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS MINOR 
CHILDREN AND ORDER 'THEM TO BE PLACED FOR 
ADOPTION. 
The statutory provisions which concern the matter 
of depriving parents of the custody of their children do 
not mention permanently depriving the parents of such 
custody, nor do they set down any standards of conduct 
which constitute a justification for an order permanently 
depriving the parents of their children, Sec. 55-10-32 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This court has pre-
viously had before it the question of what conduct 
is sufficient justification to permanently deprive a par-
ent of .a minor child in the case of In re Bradley, 109 Utah 
538, 167 P.2d 978. Barbara Bradley was the mother of 
an illegitimate child. The evidence showed repeated a-cts 
of immorality on her part, that she became infected with 
a venereal disea.se as a result of such conduct, that she 
had neglected and abandoned her minor child, and that 
she was married to a person who had previously been 
convicted of a felony and had served time in prison. 
After consideration of the evidence of her conduct, the 
Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the Juvenile 
Court awarding the custody of her minor child to other 
persons, but significantly declined to permanently bar 
11 
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her from regaining the custody of her child, saying, at 
page 985: 
"This does not mean that Barbara will be 
forever barred from obtaining the custody of her 
baby, .and the custody of the child may be changed 
when justified by the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances." 
The case of State v. Sorensen, 102 Utah 474, 132 P. 
2d 132, was .a case wherein Fern Jensen, the natural 
father of a minor child, wa_s deprived of the custody 
of his child because of his neglect and the further fact 
that he had kept the child, a girl, in an unwholesome en-
vironment by drinking, carousing, cursing, and swearing 
in the presence of the child. Sometime after being de-
prived of his child by the Juvenile Court, Jensen filed 
a petition to regain custody of the child on the basis 
that he had remarried, and that his home conditions were 
now sufficiently unproved to adequately provide for the 
child. The Juvenile Court made an order to the effect 
that if Fern Jensen conducted hin1self "becomingly" for 
a period of ten months from the date of the order, he 
would be allowed to regain the custody of his child. 
Jensen appealed the decision of the Juvenile Court to the 
Supreme Court and the Supren1e Court, in affirming 
the decision of the Juvenile Court, said at page 135: 
"Did appellant n1ake such a showing as re-
quired the lower court to award him the custody 
of his minor daughter~ The writer doubts that 
the evidence adduced at the hearing which ·was 
adverse to .appellant was .such as to justify a re-
fusal to so order. HoweYer. in Yiew of such testi-
nwny, we cannot say that the court abused its 
12 
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discretion in requiring appellant to conduct him-
self 'becomingly' for a period of ten months before 
such custody would be given, in view of the pre-
vious finding of appellant's unfitnes.s. However, 
in reaching such conclusion, we interpret the 
court's order to mean that unless during the pro-
bationary period appellant so conducts himself 
as to indicate an unfitness to have the custody 
of hi.s daughter, he shall at the end thereof be 
awarded such custody 'so long as said petitioner 
maintains a home in a suitable atmosphere to rear 
a child of the age and temperament of the child 
here in question; upon the failure on the part of 
the petitioner, Fern Jensen, the court will again 
deprive the petitioner of custody and place the 
child elsewhere.'" 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington, in 
the ease of Ex Parte Day, 189 Wash. 368, 65 P.2d 1049, 
reversed an order of the District Court on a habeas 
corpus action which permanently deprived a parent of 
the custody of his minor children. The facts in the Day 
case were as follows: The parents of the minor children 
had been divorced about seven years prior to the hearing 
and the custody of the minor children awarded to the 
mother. Shortly before the hearing the mother died and 
the minor children had been placed in the custody of 
very close friends of the mother. The father, Frank F. 
Day, sought to regain custody of the minor children by 
a writ of habeas corpus. The evidence before the trial 
court indicated that following the divorce action the 
father did not support the minor children, although he 
wa.s financially able to do so, that for a period of about 
five years he had not seen any of his children and ap-
13 
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parently made no attempt to visit them, nor had he 
manifested the slightest concern for their welfare, that 
he was an entire stranger to his children and that he 
had treated them with utter neglect. The District Court, 
after hearing the foregoing evidence, denied the writ 
of habeas corpus and entered an order permanently de-
priving the father of his three children. On appeal to 
the Supreme Court it was held that the writ of habeas 
corpus was properly denied but that the portion of the 
decree which pennanently deprived the father of the 
children should be modified. The court at page 1056, 
said: 
' 
"In one particular the decree appealed from 
must be modified. By its terms, appellant was de-
prived permanently of the care, custody, and con-
trol of his children. No such provision should have 
been included in the decree. What the future 
holds, no one can tell. It may be that at some 
future time appellant's children, or one or two of 
them, should go to him. The court properly made 
the children wards of the court. For the pre;sent 
at least, they should remain such wards. The 
decree appealed from will be 1nodified b~~ elimin-
ating therefrom that portion purporting to per-
manently dep-rive appellant of the custody of his 
children. " 
In the case of ill ass v. Vest, 7-± Ida. 328, 262 P. 2d 
116, the Idaho Supre1ne Court, on an appeal from an 
order denying a writ of habeas corpus sought by a mother 
to obtain the custody of a 1ninor child, considered the 
lower court's finding of unfitness on the part of the 
n10ther and the decree a"·arding the custody of the child 
to another couple, who were the respondents in the 
14 
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matter. In this c.ase the petitioner, the mother of the 
child, was married to a man who failed to provide for the 
child and who used intoxicating liquors to excess. During 
a period of marital difficulties the child was delivered 
to the maternal grandmother by the petitioner. The 
petitioner then went to San Francisco and while there 
she w.as charged with a felony and confined to jail. How-
ever, she was permitted to plead guilty to a misdemeanor 
and was placed on parole to her mother for one year. 
During the time that petitioner was in California, the 
maternal grandmother became ill and placed the child 
in the home of the respondents with the understanding 
that respondents would be permitted to adopt the child. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower 
court awarding the child to respondents on the ground 
that the petitioner was an unfit mother as of the time of 
the hearing because of her immoral conduct, but in re-
g.ard to her opportunity to later regain the custody of 
her child, the court said at page 122: 
"The basis upon which we affirm the judg-
ment, and the only basis, is that petitioner as of 
the time of the hearing was not a fit and proper 
person to have custody of her child for the time 
being because of her immoral conduct. 
"Affirming the judgment awarding custody 
to respondents on the ground of moral unfitness 
of petitioner does not necessarily me.an that pe-
titioner will be forever precluded from obtaining 
custody of her minor son. Such custody may be 
restored to her when she has repented and re-
formed and is otherwise shown to be a fit and 
proper person to have the custody. Goldson v. 
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Goldson, 192 Or. 611, 236 P.2d 314; 17 Am. Jur., 
sec. 684, p. 518 ; 39 An1. J ur ., sees. 25 & 26, pp. 
615 & 616." 
The weight of authority supports the position that 
courts making awards of the cu.stody of children should 
give substantial consideration to the fact that it is often 
necessary to modify orders affecting custody or even 
to make a completely different disposition of the child. 
39 Am. Jur., sec. 25, p. 615. 
The order permanently depriving appellant of his 
children gives no consideration to the rule adopted by 
the Utah Supreme Court, as well as by a great majority 
of appellate courts, which holds that a parent, whose 
child has been taken from him because of his misconduct, 
is entitled to have the child restored to him upon proof 
that he has reformed and is presently able to provide 
.a suitable home for the child. In re Bradley, 109 Utah 
538, 167 P. 2d 978; State v. Sorensen, 102 Utah 474, 132 
P.2d 132; Ex Parte Day, 189 \Vash. 368, 65 P.2d 1049; 
Moss v. Vest, 74 Ida. 328, :262 P.2d 116; 39 Am. Jur., 
Sec. 25, P. 615. 
CONCLUSION 
It is appellant's contention that the record before 
the Juvenile Court fails to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence, or by any clear and convincing evidence 
whatever, that .appellant was not a fit and proper person 
to retain the custody of his 1ninor children. \Ye earnestly 
contend that there is certainly nothing in the record to 
justify the Juvenile Court in 1naking an order per-
16 
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manently depriving him of the custody of his children 
and ordering them placed for adoption. 
In any event, the record clearly indicates that the 
Juvenile Court abu.sed its discretion in not ordering 
that the W elf.are Department continue to hold the chil-
dren under its jurisdiction, and setting a hearing at a 
later date in order that appellant's fitness and ability 
to provide a proper home for his children could be deter-
mined at such time. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
judgment of the Juvenile Court should be reversed with 
instructions to order that the custody of his minor chil-
dren be granted to .appellant, or in the alternative, that 
the matter again be heard by the Juvenile Court to deter-
mine appellant's present fitness to be granted the 
custody of his minor children. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID S. KUNZ of 
PATTERSON & KUNZ, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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